We study the effects of the ECB monetary policy and the European crises resolution policies on the 10 year sovereign bond yields of seven European countries. We find that some of the decisions have had significant impact on sovereign bond yields and have succeeded in reducing stress in the financial markets. However, the impact of the same policy decision might have been positive for some countries while negative for others, suggesting that contagion effects may be important. The economically most significant effects on the bond yields have been due to the announcement of ECB's Securities Market Programme. JEL: F34, E42, G15
Introduction
Following the creation of the monetary union in 1999, yields on euro area sovereign bonds began to converge rapidly, re ‡ecting the elimination of in ‡ation and exchange rate risks from bonds of individual countries. The convergence in sovereign bond yields was supported also by the zero risk weights assigned to government bonds in capital adequacy regulation and the European Central Bank's practice of valuing all euro area countries' bonds on the same terms as collateral for central bank credit to banks. The period of convergence was followed by a few-year phase when sovereign bond yields remained stable and low despite divergent macroeconomic and …scal developments in euro area countries.
Investors'focus turned back to sovereign debt risks soon after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. As the …nancial crisis intensi…ed and spread to the real economy, European governments had to provide support to their banking sectors and use …scal stimulus measures to support their economies. Macroeconomic fundamentals deteriorated faster in some countries than others. De…cits accumulated during the apparently tranquil phase prior to the crisis rapidly became a problem for those countries which had a limited room to manoeuvre their …scal policy.
Sovereign bond yields began to increase rapidly in countries with a weakened macroeconomic situation and …scal position or otherwise had the banking sector that was particularly vulnerable to international …nancial crises (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) . In contrast, in countries with stronger economic fundamentals (eg Germany, the Netherlands and Finland), long-term interest rates declined as a result of ‡ight-to-quality. In mid-May 2010 the Greek sovereign debt markets fell into severe stress and the crisis began to spread to other European countries. Market-based funding dried up for Greece, Ireland and Portugal, forcing these countries, one after another, to seek …nancial support in the European crisis mechanisms and the International Monetary Fund.
Euro area sovereign crises have led to a number of policy initiatives by the European …scal authorities, including the decision to establish the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as a follow up to the European Financial Stability Facility (ESFS) and the European Financial Stability Mechanism. A number of important policy initiatives have also been directed to improve the …scal discipline within the euro area. At the same time, the European Central Bank has used a series of non-standard policy measures to contain pressure to the …nancial system by providing both short-term and long-term liquidity support 1 and lowered its main policy rate to historically low levels. Enhanced liquidity support have included lengthening of the maximum maturity of re…nancing operations, extension of the eligible collateral list, provision of liquidity in foreign currencies, and provision of unlimited liquidity at a …xed rate. In addition, the ECB has set up the Covered Bond Purchase Program (CBPP) and Securities Market Program (SMP) to purchases private and public bonds.
In this paper, we study the impact of these eurowide policy decisions on the long term sovereign bond yields of seven euro area countries: Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Ireland. We study the policy e¤ects with an empirical model, where the explanatory variable is the change in the spread between the 10-year government bond yield and the 10 year euro swap rate. Our daily data runs from 1 Jan 2007 to 21 March 2012. We control for the e¤ect of credit risk, liquidity risk and the general risk appetite, as they have been found 1 to be the main risk factors determining the yields of the European sovereign bonds.
Our results suggest that in general many policy decisions have had signi…cant short term e¤ects in the European bond market. The announcement of ECB's securities market program (SMP) have had a signi…cant negative e¤ect on yield changes in all the seven euro area countries considered in this study. At the same time, we do not …nd lasting impact of the liquidity support decision on sovereign bond yields and the same applies for the ECB's covered bond purchase program (CBPP). The latter is understandable, given that the CBPP was directed to support banking system at the early phase of the crises.
The ECB interest rate decisions have mainly been anticipated in the markets, but we …nd that in some cases lowering of the policy rate has led to a decline in the long term rate. News on …nancial support package requests and decisions have had some mixed impacts. The decisions on support packages have decreased yields in Greece, Ireland and Portugal, but increased the yields in Spain and Italy, suggesting possible policy contagion e¤ects. On the one hand, the decisions related to European Stability Mechanism (ESM) have caused an increase in the yields in Germany, Ireland and Greece but no e¤ects in other countries. On the other hand, the decisions regarding the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) seem to have decreased the yield changes signi…cantly in most of the countries. The decision on the European economic recovery plan (EERP) had a signi…cant increasing e¤ect on the yields of most of the countries, but signi…cantly negative e¤ect on the yield changes in Portugal and Ireland. Other policy decisions, mainly related to strengthening of the growth and stability pack and improving of …scal discipline have not had lasting impact on bond yields.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section summarizes the …ndings of the literature related to our paper. Our empirical model is presented in the third section, and the estimation results of the empirical model are presented in section four. The …fth section …nally concludes our …ndings.
Determinants of the sovereign bond yields
There exists a vast literature studying the factors that determine the yields of the euro area sovereign bonds. The earlier literature focused on understanding the convergence in the euro area sovereign bond yields after introducing the EMU. The more recent literature on the other hand has been trying to explain the fast divergence of the yields in the same set of sovereign bonds.
In this section we …rst take a closer look at the evolution of the euro area government bond yields. We then provide some theoretical background for the empirical studies explaining the determinants of the sovereign bond yields and …nally summarize the main results of the empirical literature.
Evolution of euro area government bond yields
After the introduction of euro the yields of the euro area sovereign bonds converged rapidly.
At that time this development was believed to be fairly natural. Given that there was no longer exchange rate and in ‡ation risk, it was quite understandable that the yields were decreasing. At the same time with the decreased price for debt, the liquidity and credit risks decreased as well. The phase of convergence was followed by few years of apparent harmony, and the credit market focused more on corporate bonds and other 'more exciting' debt instruments.
The markets turned their focus to the euro area sovereign debt market again after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Figure 1 presents the evolution of sovereign bond yields for selected euro area countries. It can be seen that the development during the past …ve years has been dramatic. It is easy to see that there has been a regime 3 shift in the pricing of the European sovereign bonds. Figure 1 . Yields of the 10-year government bonds for selected euro area countries When the …nancial crisis intensi…ed and spread to the real economy, the euro area governments provided support for the banking sector and used stimulus measures for supporting their economies. However, the strength of the spillovers from …nancial markets to the real economy was surprisingly strong and the macroeconomic fundamentals deteriorated in many euro area countries dramatically, leading to signi…cant widening of the euro area bond yields.
Long term interest rates started to rise especially in those countries that had accumulated de…cits during apparently tranquil times or otherwise had the banking sector that was particularly vulnerable to international …nancial crises. The crisis hit especially hard Greece, where debt markets have been under severe stress since the mid 2010, but later on the debt crisis started to spread also to other …nancially vulnerable euro area countries with well known consequences. Greece, Ireland and most recently Portugal have been driven out from the markets and are now primarily …nanced by the European crises resolution mechanisms and the IMF. Lastly, also the large euro area countries Spain and Italy have su¤ered from deteriorating market sentiment driving up the yields and hampering their ability to roll-over debt and …nance their de…cits at sustainable rates. 
Theoretical background
The empirical studies explaining the determinants of the sovereign bond yields often rely (loosely) on the structural model of Merton (1974) . The key idea behind the Merton model is that a risky zero-coupon bond has the same payo¤ structure as a risk-free bond plus a put option on the …rm's value, with a strike price equal to the face value of the …rm's debt. Therefore, the value of the put option is the cost of eliminating the credit risk and the default-risky bonds can hence be priced by using standard option pricing theory such as Black-Scholes equation.
The model is relying on an assumption that the …rms default is triggered when the …rm value falls below some threshold and that this threshold is a function of the amount of debt that the …rm has. This relates the corporate credit risk to its fundamentals such as leverage ratio and the volatility of the …rm value. The third factor that determines the price of a default risky bond in the Merton model is the risk-free interest rate. The original Merton model has been extended in various ways. The extension that is the most relevant to us is the one by Gapen et al (2005) . While the original Merton model considers the corporate bonds, Gapen et al (2005) extend the model for the default-risky sovereign bonds. Gapen et al. (2005) state, that the main factors of the sovereign credit risk are the volatility of sovereign assets and a country's leverage.
Even though the Merton model has had an in ‡uence on some of the empirical studies of yield determination, most of the papers are purely empirical 2 . There exists strong empirical evidence, discussed in more detail in section 2:3, suggesting that besides the credit risk, the sovereign yields are a¤ected by liquidity risk, general risk appetite and perhaps the interaction terms of these three factors.
Empirical evidence on yield determination
The empirical evidence on the determinants of the European sovereign bond yields is extensive, yet mixed. Di¤erent factors have been found to be relevant depending on the used set of countries, time period, data frequency, estimation methodology or proxies for the di¤erent risk factors. One thing that almost all studies seem to agree upon, however, is that there exists a common risk factor that re ‡ects investors'changing attitudes towards risk (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2011; Barrios et al.. 2009; Favero et al., 2010; Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009; Pozzi and Woslwijk, 2008; Sgrerri and Zoli, 2009) . The rationale behind these …ndings is that higher uncertainty increases investors'risk aversion and this causes them to restructure their portfolios. Typically this is done in favor of bonds with safe-heaven status, and hence the yields of the bonds with higher default risk increase.
Even though it is widely agreed that such a factor of general risk attitude or appetite exists, there is still an ongoing debate on how to measure this factor, and what are the underlying causes of the changes in investors' risk aversion. Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) suggest that the ECB policy rate is the key issue driving the aggregate risk perception. Others concentrate less on the causes of uncertainty and settle for measuring the risk attitude with some …nancial market variables that describe the uncertainty in the global …nancial markets, such as the S&P 500 implied volatility index, i.e. VIX-index 3 (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2011; Beber et al., 2009; Borgy et al., 2011; Gerlach et al., 2010) or the spread between the yields of US corporate bonds against US treasury bills (Attinasi et al., 2009; Favero et al., 2010; Haugh et al., 2009 ).
Besides the common market risk factors, the models of yield determination also include country-speci…c risk factors. The most important of those is the sovereign credit risk.
Credit risk premium is the part of the yield that an investor demands as a compensation for tolerating the non-zero probability that a government defaults totally or partially and but are instead diverted to the sovereign debt market and hence cause increasing default risk.
3 The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index, i.e. VIX-index is constructed by using the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index options with di¤erent strikes. It re ‡ects the expected movement in the S&P 500 index over the next 30-day period and is hence typically used as an index of market sentiment or fear. Bekaert et al. (2010) proposed a decomposition of VIX index to risk appetite and uncertainty factors.
the investor does not regain his full investment or interest.
Most of the existing studies have used data sets with low frequency (monthly or quarterly). This has some advantages, such as being able to use the macroeconomic statistics (e.g. debt-to-GDP, budget de…cit-to-GDP, debt service ratio and current account balance or expected …scal positions by using forecasts on those same variables) that are released only rarely to describe the …scal position and hence credit risk of the country (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2011; Aß mann and Boysen-Hogrefe, 2011; Attinasi et al., 2009; Barrios et al., 2009; Haugh et al., 2009) . Some papers have also used a country's credit rating as an indicator for credit risk (e.g. Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009 ). The studies that use higher frequency data typically use other measures for credit risk, such as credit default swap (CDS) spreads 4 (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2011; Barrios et al., 2009; Beber et al., 2009 ), because the variables that change as infrequently as once in a month or quarter would probably not have an e¤ect on noisy daily yields.
The empirical evidence on the relevance of the …scal imbalances is mixed. However, an increasingly common …nding in the literature is that expected …scal de…cits have an e¤ect on long-term government bond yields (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2011; Attinasi et al. 2009; Sgherri and Zoli, 2009; Barbosa and Costa, 2010; Gerlach et al., 2010) .
Good summary of …ndings of this literature is provided by Haugh et al. (2009) . The impact of CDS spreads on bond yields has been found to be positive. However, their use is somewhat problematic because of the potential endogeneity problems. As being a tradable instrument in the same markets, the prices of credit default swaps are likely to be determined at least partially by the same factors as the bonds themselves.
Another potential risk factor explaining the yield di¤erentials is the liquidity risk. If the bond markets are large and deep, investors are able to …nd a counterpart more easily and execute trades when they choose. In the liquid markets it is also less likely that prices will change due to individual transactions. Due to these reasons, investor will require a smaller premium in terms of the yield. Therefore, the liquidity risk premium measures the extra interest rate an investor requires for bearing the liquidity risk.
Liquidity is typically considered hard to measure. The used proxies have been e.g. bidask spreads (Aß mann and Boysen-Hogrefe, 2011; Fontana and Scheicher, 2010; Gómez-Puig, 2009) or the size of the government bond markets (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2011; Bernoth et al., 2012; Gomez-Puig, 2009; Haugh et al., 2009; Attinasi et al., 2009 ), or some other measures such as the yield spread between bonds issued by KFW and German government bonds, used by Schwartz (2009).
The …ndings on the role of the liquidity risk seem to be mixed. Some …nd liquidity risk to be an important factor for yield determination (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2011; Attinasi et al., 2009; Barrios et al., 2009; Favero et al., 2010; Gerlach et al., 2010; Gómez-Puig, 2009; Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009; Sgherri and Zoli, 2009; Schwartz, 2009 ), whereas sometimes it has not been found to have signi…cant impact on yields (Bernoth and Erdogan, 2010; von Hagen et al., 2011) .
Other variables that have been included in the models of yield determination are e.g. the risk-free interest rate (e.g. Fontana and Scheicher, 2010; Oliveira et al., 2012) , local stock market indices (e.g. Oliveira et al., 2012) , volatility of the local asset markets (e.g. Barrios et al., 2009; Fontana and Scheicher, 2010, Oliveira et al., 2012) , foreign exchange market volatility (e.g. Barrios et al., 2009; Fontana and Scheicher, 2010) and term structure variables (Fontana and Scheicher, 2010; Oliveira et al., 2012) . Neither of these variables has gained a status of belonging to the set of "core risk factors" as the three variables mentioned above.
One reason that could explain the mixed empirical …ndings is that the relevance of the di¤erent risk factors changes in time as suggested by e.g. Aß mann and Boysen-Hogrefe (2011), Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2011) , Barrios et al. (2009 ), Oliveira et al. (2012 and many others. It might not be very surprising that the risk factors would have changed between the pre-emu, pre-crisis and crisis periods, but it has been also suggested that there have been two or three regime shifts also during the …nancial crisis (Barbosa and Costa, 2010; Caceres et al., 2010) .
Many studies (e.g. Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2011; Bernoth et al., 2010) con…rm that the markets have been penalizing bad …scal positions more during the …nancial crisis. Also the required liquidity risk premium has been found to be higher during the crisis (Aß mann and Boysen-Hogrefe, 2011). The relevance of the global investors' risk aversion has also increased during the crisis (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2011; Barrios et al., 2009; Bernoth et al., 2010; Haugh et al., 2009; Sgherri and Zoli, 2009 ) and the market has also priced the interaction between the risk aversion and the credit and liquidity risks (Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009; von Hagen et al., 2011) .
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The contagion in the euro area sovereign markets has been studied e.g. by Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2011), Caceres et al. (2010) , Claeys and Vašíµ cek (2012) . Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2011) use monthly 10 year bond data for ten euro area countries covering the period from Jan 1999 to Feb 2010 and …nd that many EMU countries, especially Portugal, Ireland and Spain, have experienced contagion from Greece. Claeys and Vašíµ cek (2012) also …nd signi…cant spillover e¤ects in these countries. According to Caceres et al. (2010) , after September 2008, risk of contagion was also an important factor pricing the euro area sovereign bonds.
From the number of papers examining the yield determination during the …nancial crisis, the paper that comes closest to ours is that of Attinasi et al. (2009) Therefore, the results of Attinasi et al. (2009) suggest that the stress in the national banking sector was transferred to the public sector through government's rescue packages.
Instead of using announcements on banking rescue packages, this paper contributes to the literature by studying the impact of the announcements on various political decisions made in Europe during the …nancial and debt crises. To the best of our knowledge, the e¤ect of the policy decisions on euro area sovereign yields has not been studied before. Our paper di¤ers from others also by data frequency. In order to be able to capture the policy impact from other factors in the bond markets, we need to use daily data. Other papers typically concentrate on slower dynamics (weekly, monthly or quarterly) of the sovereign bond markets. Our empirical model on yield determination and policy e¤ects is explained more carefully in the next section.
Empirical model on yield spreads
This section presents the empirical model used for studying the determinants of the yield spreads on the European sovereign bonds. We …rst describe the …nancial market data set, then the policy decisions of interest and …nally the econometric model to be estimated. 9
Financial market data
Our data set of dependent variables includes daily yield spreads between the benchmark 10-year government bond 5 and the 10-year euro swap rate from 1 January 2007 to 21
March 2012 for the following countries 6 : Germany (DE), France (F R), Spain (ES), Italy (IT ), Portugal (P T ), Ireland (IE) and Greece (GR). The dependent variable is henceforth denoted as y i;t for the country i, where i = fDE; F R; ES; IT; P T; IE; GRg and day t. The group of countries was selected such that it includes both countries in stress and those that are healthier. The selected countries also vary in terms of the size of the economy.
The ten-year bond maturity was chosen because it has been the most common horizon used in the similar literature. The euro swap rate (e.g. Beber et al., 2009 ) and German government bond yield (e.g. Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2011; Haugh et al., 2009 ) have both been used as a measure for the risk-free interest rate in the literature. From these two we chose to use the …rst one, because the euro swap rate has some advantages compared to use of the German Bund yield. First, it allows for adding Germany in the analysis and second, according to e.g. Beber et al. (2009) it is commonly seen as the measure which the market participants prefer as a risk-free rate.
As discussed in the subsection 2.3, there exists wide empirical evidence that the sovereign bond yields are determined by three main risk factors: credit risk, liquidity risk and general risk appetite. Following the literature, we also try to capture these risk factors by adding proxies for these risk factors in the model as explanatory variables. We measure the country-speci…c risk factors, i.e. credit risk and liquidity risk by 10-year CDS spreads, henceforth denoted as CDS i;t and bid-ask spreads of the 10-year bond yields, henceforth denoted as BAS i;t , respectively.
Typical proxies for country credit risk used in the literature are e.g. ratio of debt to its assets, i.e. leverage ratio, or some measures for the current or expected …scal imbalances.
However, given that our data set frequency is daily, and these macroeconomy based proxies are usually available quarterly or monthly at best, they are unfortunately less suitable for our purposes. CDS price is a market based proxy which has the advantage of being available on daily basis. However, it is very likely that the CDS spreads and the bond spreads share some determinants, one of which could be the international risk appetite.
Therefore the use of CDS prices introduces a potential endogeneity problem. We reduce 5 The data were obtained from Due to lack of data on some explanatory variables, the dates are not exactly these for all countries. the risk of endogeneity problem by using the lagged CDS spread as explanatory variable 7 .
Another potential problem with the CDS spreads and bid-ask spreads is their correlation with other explanatory variables, i.e. measures for the risk aversion. Even though the bid-ask spread is widely accepted as a measure for liquidity, it is also recognized that the liquidity risk correlates strongly with the market uncertainty. The same applies for credit risk, although the empirical evidence is less clear. To study the relevance of these e¤ects we do some robustness checks by including interaction terms between the CDS spread/bid ask spread and measures for risk aversion.
As for the general risk aversion, we use VIX-index, henceforth denoted as V IX t , to describe the risk appetite of the global investors and iTraxx Europe index 8 , henceforth denoted as IT RX t , to proxy the general risk atmosphere in the European debt market. We also considered other indicators describing uncertainty in the …nancial markets, but they all turned out to be insigni…cant and were hence left out from the …nal model speci…cation.
These indicators were the VSTOXX index 9 to describe the uncertainty in the European stock markets, the one month implied volatility of the EUR/USD exchange rate to represent the stress in the currency markets 10 , the squared bond yield changes to measure the uncertainty in a particular sovereign bond market and the weekly CISS index 11 by Hollo et al. (2012) to describe the level of systemic risk at the European …nancial markets.
Besides the di¤erent risk factors, we considered including the 3-month Euribor interest rate to proxy the risk-free short term interest rate in the model, but it turned out to be statistically insigni…cant and was hence left out from the …nal model speci…cation.
In order to capture possible direct contagion e¤ects between the countries, we include the lagged bond yield spreads of all the countries as an explanatory variable. We recognize that the contagion e¤ects are not best captured with a noisy daily data, but we include the contagion variables as a …rst approximation to see if there are any signs of patterns of contagion between the countries.
Besides the risk factors and the contagion variables, our model includes dummy vari- 7 The lagged values are also used for bid-ask spread and the general risk aversion variables. 8 The Markit iTraxx Europe index comprises 125 equally weighted credit default swaps on investment grade European corporate entities.
9 VSTOXX index measures the implied volatility of the EURO STOXX 50 index options and is created jointly by Deutche Borse and Goldman Sachs to measure volatility in the euro-area.
1 0 Implied volatility is a measure of the market expected future volatility of a currency exchange rate from now until the maturity date.
1 1 CISS index is a composite index using information from the total of 15 individual …nancial stress measures from …nancial intermediaries (banks and non-banks), money markets, securities (stocks and bonds) and foreign exchange markets). Linear interpolation is used for changing weekly data frequency to daily. ables for the policy decisions. These are discussed in more detail in the next subsection.
Policy decisions
All the European wide policy decisions we are interested are listed in Appendix. To study the impact of these events, we create two dummy variables for each policy decision such that the …rst dummy variable equals one at the date of the announcement of the policy decision and the second dummy variable equals one on the day following the announcement, and zero otherwise.
Instead of creating just one dummy variable for each decision, we create two of them to make sure we capture the e¤ect of the decision fully. In some cases it might be that the decision is done in the evening when the markets are already closed for that day, and hence the market reacts to the announcement only in the day following the announcement.
Also, it might be that the e¤ect of some of the decisions on sovereign risk is di¢ cult to judge, and hence the market is processing the decision longer than one day.
Altogether we have identi…ed more than 50 important policy decisions since January 2007. Because such a large amount of dummy variables would easily lead to multicollinearity problems in estimation, we divide the policy decision to eleven categories, and combine the dummy variables belonging to the same category. The policy categories and the policy decisions belonging to each category are presented in Table 1 .
The …rst …ve categories include all the policy decisions made by ECB. The decisions to increase and decrease the interest rate are studied separately, and the categories of these dummy variables are denoted as ECBup t and ECBdw t , respectively. The dummy variable related to ECB's liquidity support decisions is denoted as ECBls t . The policy announcements related to the ECB's covered bond purchase program and securities market program are studied separately, and the dummy variables for these categories are denoted as ECBcb t and ECBsmp t , respectively 12 .
As for the rest of the groups we try to disentangle among the decisions that have implied a launch of the new …nancial support program (requests for the support packages, denoted as SP req t , and the announcements related to the decisions of the support packages, denoted as SP dec t , are studied separately), announcements related to the creation of the ESM (denoted as ESM t , decisions on widening of the EFSF mandate (denoted as EF SF t ), announcement of the European Economic Recovery Plan (denoted as EERP t ) as well as other decisions related to European economic governance (denoted as OD t ).
These other decisions are primarily related to strengthening of the stability and growth pact, and improving of …scal discipline and …scal coordination in the euro area. 
The model
To study the determinants of the yield spreads of the European sovereign bond markets, and the impact of the …scal and monetary policy decisions in the Europe during the debt crisis, we estimate a following model (1) with the Ordinary Least Squares estimation method for all the countries (i = Germany; F rance; Spain; Italy; P ortugal; Ireland; Greece).
13
The dependent variable and the explanatory variables are explained in subsections 3:1 and 3:2. As the dependent variable is very likely to be nonstationary, noticed also by many studies using similar data to ours (e.g. Fontana and Scheicher, 2010) , the model is estimated in di¤erences.
is a constant, i for i = fDE; F R; ES; IT; P T; IE;
GRg are parameters that describe the potential contagion e¤ects between countries, i for i = fCDS; BAS; V IX; IT RXg are parameters for controlling the e¤ects of the di¤er-ent risk factors, i for i = fECBup_n; ECBdw_n; ECBls_n; ECBcb_n; ECBsmp_n; SP req_n; SP dec_n; ESM _n; EF SF _n; EERP _n; OD_ng capture the impact of different categories of policy decisions on the day of the decision (n = 0) and on the following day (n = 1) and " i;t is the error term of the model. The Newey-West standard errors (with 30 lags) are used because of the unde…ned form of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the residuals.
The results
In this section we present the estimation results of the empirical model (1) proposed in the subsection 3:3. The main results are presented in Tables 2 and 3 . We …rst summarize the …ndings related to the three risk factors: credit and liquidity risk and the general risk aversion as well as the contagion variables. We then summarize the impact of the policy decisions on the sovereign bond yields. Finally, we present …ndings of some robustness checks related to the results.
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Risk factors and contagion variables
According to our estimation results (Table 2) , the impact of CDS spreads and bid ask spreads, which are used as proxies for credit and liquidity risk, respectively, are typically positive, as expected. Interestingly, the bid ask spread correlates negatively with the yield changes in the case of Ireland and Portugal. The negative parameter coe¢ cient may re ‡ect the ECB's policy interventions in the secondary bond markets when the liquidity has been drying up in the markets and contributed to increasing yields. If this is the case, the supportive participation by the ECB to increase liquidity in the Portugese and Irish sovereign bond market has successfully reduced the liquidity risk in these markets.
Of the proxies for the general risk appetite, the impact of iTraxx index is signi…cant only in the case of Germany. For all the other countries the parameter coe¢ cient for iTraxx index does not di¤er from zero (in case for Ireland iTraxx is positive and signi…cant at 10% level). The impact of VIX-index is signi…cantly negative for almost all countries. Negative coe¢ cient is perhaps best explained by the fact that VIX index re ‡ects the riskiness of the stock markets rather than the general risk appetite per se 13 . This is supported by the fact that both variables describing the general risk appetite have been at their highest level in the beginning of the …nancial crisis, especially during the year 2008. Hence, it might be that at that time the uncertainty was re ‡ected more in the other segments of the …nancial markets such as stock markets (especially banking sector) and corporate bond markets, and the sovereign bonds were seen as a less risky choice. However, it is quite clear that neither of these risk aversion measures does capture the current uncertainty among the European bond market investors very well. Given that we did not …nd any signi…cant impact by using some alternative measures for risk aversion (described in subsection 3:1), it might be that general risk appetite is less important factor in pricing the European sovereign bonds compared to the credit and liquidity risks. It is also possible that our credit and liquidity riks measures are re ‡ecting the uncertainty in the bond market so strongly, that it its e¤ect is di¢ cult to identify separately.
So far, our results for contagion channels, other than those directly related to the European crises resolution policies, are rather weak. There is some evidence of negative correlation between the yield changes of some countries (e.g. Ireland and Greece) and Germany, which might be explained by the ‡ight-to-safety. There were also some signi…cant parameter coe¢ cients within the countries Spain, Italy and Portugal, but it is di¢ cult to interpret these results as a sign of systematic patterns of contagion. Table 3 . The model is estimated in di¤erences and using Newey-West standard errors with 30 lags. *, ** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% signi…cance levels, respectively.
Policy decisions
The impacts of the policy decisions vary (Table 3) The decisions related to the government support packages are mixed. The decision to request …nancial support has typically not a¤ected the markets signi…cantly, maybe Table  2 . The model is estimated in di¤erences and using Newey-West standard errors with 30 lags. *, ** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% signi…cance levels, respectively. because the decisions have been already anticipated. At the same time, the decisions to grant the package have had signi…cant, yet mixed impacts. The decision has decreased the yields in the receiving countries, but increased the yields in Spain and Italy. The latter may re ‡ect contagion e¤ect, whereby the markets have re-evaluated the riskiness of sovereign bonds in the other euro area countries after the …nancial support decision has been made. The fact that response of German 10 -year bund yield to …nancial support has been mostly positive, may well re ‡ect the risks sharing aspects of the …nancial rescue packages.
The decision on ESM seems to have increased the long term interest rates in some countries, while the decisions related to the EFSF has rather decreased the long term interest rates. Especially the parameter coe¢ cients of Ireland and Greece, which are statistically signi…cant and rather large, suggest that these policy decisions have been successful at least in the short run.
The parameter coe¢ cient for the European Economic Recovery Plan is positive, as expected, for the most of the countries. Short run economic stabilization will probably increase the uncertainty related to the long run sustainability of the public sector, which dominates the interest rate e¤ect in most of the countries. However, the coe¢ cient is signi…cantly negative for Ireland and Portugal. One possible explanation is that the exports in these two small open economies are gaining from the euro area wide economic …scal stimulus plans and hence the markets have interpreted this as good news for the sovereign debt in the short run as well. If this is the case, then it is clear that short term stabilization concerns have dominated the sustainability concerns (at the time) in these countries.
Other policy decisions have had statistically signi…cant negative e¤ect on the sovereign yields in Germany, France and Spain on the day of the announcement. However, this negative impact has been overturned by a positive coe¢ cient on the following day. For other countries, the e¤ects have not been statistically signi…cant.
Robustness checks and non-linearities
There exists strong heteroskedasticity in the error terms, which implies that our empirical model is not completely adequate. At this point we deal the heteroskedasticity by using robust standard errors, but we believe the model could be improved. For example, the considered variables for risk appetite do not seem to work well. Most of them are at the highest during the …nancial crisis in 2008-2009, but are not capturing the uncertainty at the current debt crisis well enough. We also tried to model the heteroskedasticity, but at least the standard GARCH-models seem not to be adequate for modeling the heteroskedasticity.
It is also likely that there exist some non-linearities in the determinants of the model either with respect to time, themselves, each other or some other variables not included in our model. We have examined the possibility of non-linearities with respect to the regressors by themselves by adding squared regressors as explanatory variables in to the model. With some minor exceptions, they all turned out to be statistically insigni…cant.
We investigated the potential non-linearities with respect to the regressors for each other by adding some interaction terms between the credit risk and general risk aversion, and liquidity risk and general risk aversion to the model. We have also studied the possibility that there exist nonlinear relationships with respect to the level of uncertainty by using the linearity tests against the Smooth Transition -type of nonlinearity. By adding the interaction terms we found some signi…cant e¤ects, although not very systematic ones. The linearity test also suggests that there exist nonlinearities with respect to the uncertainty measures such as yield volatility and CISS index.
We also examined the possibility of instabilities in the parameter coe¢ cients, and it seems that there exists (at least one) regime shift that is situated towards the end of the data set. The transition time seemed to vary across countries. The results are so preliminary that we have decided to exclude them at this point. It could be that the instability test is detecting the same nonlinearities discovered by the linearity test suggesting nonlinearity against uncertainty.
The results of the model with nonlinearities are potentially interesting. Most importantly, they did not have signi…cant e¤ects on the policy announcement dummies and hence we believe that the results regarding the policy e¤ects are relatively robust.
Conclusions
In this paper we study the impact of the monetary policy and the European crisis resolution policy decisions made during the latest …nancial crisis on the long term sovereign bond yields of seven European countries. We examine the policy e¤ects with an empirical model where we control the e¤ect of credit and liquidity risks as well as general risk aversion and contagion between the countries.
We …nd that many decisions made for stabilizing the European debt crisis have had signi…cant e¤ects on the sovereign yields at least in the short run. As expected, the decisions have caused di¤erent kind of reactions depending on the country. A decision that eases the pressure in one country may increase the risks in others re ‡ecting contagion, but possibly also the risk sharing nature of the …nancial support related decisions. In general, however, it seems that the reactions to the policy decisions have been stabilizing i.e. those expected by the policy maker The ECB's SMP seem to have had the strongest immidiate stabilizing e¤ect on the bond yields, whereas the decisions related to the new European economic governance has not been very successful in reducing the uncertainty in the countries whose sovereign debt 19 markets have been under stress. The uncertainty related to the …scal sustainability is probably dominating the impact of those decisions that should improve the European …scal landscape in the long run. This may also re ‡ect the high political risk associated to these decisions and an unproven commitment of individual Member States to collectively follow the rules.
Finally, it is very important to understand, which part of yield changes is caused by expectations related to the changes in economic fundamentals, and which part is caused by the changes in the risk appetite. If the increases in the yields are caused by the increased credit risk, it is very likely that the yields are going to stay high for a very long time. In this case it is not enough to provide time and liquidity to these markets, but the trust of the markets are gained only by improving the long term sustainability of the government …scal position and increasing the credibility of public policy making
